

ATTACKING THE ENEMY'S WILL: THE DANGERS OF MAKING CONFLICT PLANNING TOO SIMPLE

**A MONOGRAPH
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ABSTRACT

ATTACKING THE ENEMY'S WILL: THE DANGERS OF MAKING CONFLICT PLANNING TOO SIMPLE. by MAJ Steven E. McKay, USAF, MA, SUNY Plattsburgh, 75 pages.

This monograph is about planning strategy for the conduct of military intervention. Using popular, but often misunderstood or misquoted theory from some of the most popular strategic theorists, this monograph attempts to dispel the myth that strategic planning for military intervention is as easy as applying a standard planning process. Because planning has transitioned to the use of planning processes, planners and strategists have become careless in their analysis of the enemy and the situation. The development of strategy has been replaced by an over-concern with the completion of the planning process. Rather than performing in-depth analysis of the enemy and situation to determine courses of action and develop carefully thought out objectives and strategy, accurate courses of action have been replaced by a philosophy of simply attacking the enemy's will with maximum force. The concern has become one of process rather than product.

The purpose of this monograph is to define the concept of the enemy's will and explain the importance of understanding it; then, to demonstrate that importance using historical examples. The focus is about strategy: understanding will and its affect in warfare. Sun Tzu's quote on knowing the enemy is one of the oldest, yet the most applicable statements ever made about strategy and planning for armed conflict. Analysis of the enemy and analysis of friendly capabilities are the keys to developing a successful course of action to engage a belligerent force--therefore, analysis of the enemy and its will is the foundation to the development of intervention strategy. As Clausewitz points out, war is all about will, a battle or test of will--the ability to "impose" will upon another entity. Fuller highlights the importance of considering that the enemy must be thought of as capable and surprising and reminds us that the enemy has a vote.

This monograph provides an answer to the question, "what do we really mean when we say we're going to attack the enemy's will?" This is done by way of defining both the terms enemy and will. Enemy is defined to developing an understanding of a newer, more complex enemy and larger spectrum of conflict. The term will is defined to understand the parts of an enemy entity and the complex effect the many influences of will have upon that enemy. By providing these definitions, demonstrating sample analysis, and providing historical support, it is hoped the reader will develop a greater appreciation for knowing the situation, and analyzing the enemy more carefully to develop an accurate understanding of the enemy and its will, to ultimately plan the best possible courses of action for a military intervention.

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

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INTRODUCTION

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.

- Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*¹

War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will

- Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*²

We must look upon our enemy as a bold and intelligent antagonist who will make the utmost use of his means as influenced by the conditions.

- J. F. C. Fuller, *The Foundations of the Science of War*³

Air power possessed, in their opinion, the potential to overcome a nation's will to resist.

- Planning Opinion from World War II Air Campaign Planners⁴

These quotes represent the essence of this paper. This monograph is about strategy: understanding will and its affect in warfare. Sun Tzu's quote is one of the oldest, yet the most applicable statements ever made about strategy and planning for armed conflict. Analysis of the enemy and analysis of friendly capabilities are the keys to developing a successful course of action to engage a belligerent force--therefore, analysis of the enemy and its will is the foundation to the development of intervention strategy. As Clausewitz points out, war is all about will, a battle or test of will--the ability to "impose" will upon another entity. Fuller's quote highlights the importance of considering that the enemy must be thought of as capable

and surprising. He reminds us that the enemy has a vote. Finally, the planning opinion statement is an idea of what maneuver warfare strategy can do against an enemy or opponent and has become a common objective of more modern day war planning strategists.

And why not? By attacking the enemy's will, the counter-force can achieve "strategic paralysis," the new modern goal of warfare, and force the enemy to capitulate. This will limit bloodshed and achieve victory quickly and easily--the only kind of war that would be popular and acceptable for the American public. A common strategic thought today says when a nation-state loses its will to fight, it has no other alternatives. It is defeated. Following the forced defeat, all that remains is to insert an occupation force nearby to ensure peace takes hold thus achieving the desired end-state--peace. There you have it, the perfect plan for the late Twentieth Century "McConflict;" nice, clean, neat.

The McConflict Planning Process

Planners and strategists don't have to be outstanding thinkers or in-depth analysts any more because there are many campaign planning "processes" which take most of the work out of planning, analysis, and strategy development. These have been developed from our deep understanding of Total Quality Management philosophy or the ability to become a "learning organization."⁵ Planners today only have to attend a short course on campaign planning and analysis, and they will have all the tools they need.

These courses are the military service's pseudo-pharmaceutical laboratories that develop planning processes which enable the students to apply their "cure" to the conflict situation. Because deep-thinking theorists have done all the brain-work already, it is no longer necessary

to send students to lengthy schools to learn military theory and doctrine for themselves. They can benefit from the so-called experts who have developed the one-size fits all processes (planning checklists) that can be applied to any world crisis situation and achieve the necessary results without all the time consuming study. The message taught to planners in these short courses is--the code has been broken, the lessons learned from Desert Storm--apply the chosen strategic planning process, do not exceed normal dosage, and victory is assured!

Conveniently, each service has developed its own process which it believes can remedy the situation. The Army has the four-part Deliberate Decision Making Process (DDMP), which is surprisingly similar to the Crisis Action Planning, Joint Planning Process (hummm, wonder how that happened?). The Marine Corps has the fifteen-step Staff Planning Process. The Air Force has the 5-step Air Campaign Planning Process based on the teachings of Colonel John Warden and his theory of parallel warfare. Each of these individually will provide the correct means to take apart an enemy and achieve victory. Using these processes is as easy as following a checklist, or a cookbook recipe--all are useful against the common enemy.

But what about the services working together in the joint arena? Can these processes co-exist side-by-side. Sure, that's why there is a Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC), and a Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC), under the Joint Forces Commander (we'll leave the Navy out of this since the Navy prefers to be by themselves, based on the experience of Desert Storm--the experience we base all future war-fighting on). The air and the ground components develop their plans separately (Marine Corps separate also from the Army), in their own headquarters based on their own processes (there is a liaison, or exchange officer on the planning staff for coordination and/or advice). With a little bit of

“coordination” (read leveraging) between the headquarters, a time-line can be put together to make the plans coexist. From previous experience, the first component done with their most lethal plan probably has the best chance of influencing the JFC, so speed and developing the most lethal plan are important.

Once the separate plans are developed, they are presented to the JFC for approval. In this regard, the JFC acts as a sort of referee, to make the right calls and provide the right resources to make the plan work (fortunately, we are talking about practice U.S. planning exercises, so its always assumed there are more than enough resources and forces readily available--that is never a problem). The briefings given to the JFC are all electronic now, via computer (this is a must, and this part of the planning course is what actually takes the longest to learn). The JFC adds his guidance, then gives approval to the plans making the air and sea superiority phase I; strategic attack phase II; interdiction and battlefield preparation phase III; and adding the ground plan as phase IV. Once all this is done it is time to execute, attacking the enemy's will, forcing capitulation which causes the enemy to give-up, and there you have it...end-state achieved. Thus, the bottom-line: the key to the McConflict Planning Process is just...attack the enemy's will.

Strategic Planning in the Real World

The McConflict spoof, the fast-food approach to planning is used to illustrate a point. Strategic planning in today's environment is neither that easy nor that quick. The scenario presented is a not-to-far-from-the-truth example of the oversimplification that is going-on in the strategy and planning arena. Rather than performing an in-depth analysis of the situation

and the enemy, students in today's planning training exercises are selecting common objectives--like attacking the enemy's will--because that's what was done in the past. But strategy and planning can't be that easy. There are too many variables to overcome and understand before courses of action can be designed.

There is, first of all, great difficulty in joining service planning processes together in the joint environment, because there is little consensus on just how it should be done. While a joint planning process is described in joint publications, the difficulty arises at the Joint Task Force level where a synthesis is required. Unfortunately, the synthesis that occurs usually leaves out much of what has been accomplished by the individual services; especially in regard to intelligence and strategic analysis. While much is being said about how the joint process is improving and all the services are starting to finally get along, each service continues to develop its own concepts devoid of input from the others.

But even more difficult than synthesizing the processes themselves is understanding the new concept of war: who the enemy is or will be--both have changed radically over the past ten years. Unfortunately, both the service's and joint planning processes are slipping further behind in their ability to keep up. This is due in large part to the fixation of the military services to continue their age old tradition of refighting the last successful war, which in this case, was the Gulf War.

This is especially true for the Air Force. Because of the tremendous success achieved in light of the many previous floundering efforts to establish the dominance of air power in war, the Air Force is living in its past glory at the expense of responding and adapting to the changing complex environment of military intervention going on around them. The Air

Force's Air Campaign Planning Process is a direct descendant of the process used by John Warden to design the Instant Thunder air campaign for Desert Storm (and a not-so-distant cousin to the same process used by Colonel Haywood Hansell to plan the bomber offensive on Germany in World War II).⁶ Since then it has become the standard for air planning, even though the nature of conflict and the nature of the enemy have changed drastically since the war in the Gulf. The unfortunate and unintended consequences of the success in the Gulf is a generation of Air Force planners who believe that all that is necessary to resolve a conflict situation is develop a strategic attack campaign against any enemy, and after enough precision bombs fall on their heads, the enemy will give-up or be forced to the peace talks. This philosophy is narrow-minded, myopic and unfortunate, because it lacks strategic vision relying on the direct use of military force as the only way to change an enemy's will; and it lacks consideration of the effectiveness of combined arms in conjunction with the use of the other forms of national power.

Consider the current operational tempo and the military intervention situations that have occurred since the Gulf War. Combine that with the state of world regional affairs and its both clear and evident that the military intervention situations now and for the future are different from Desert Storm. As Daniel Bolger points out in his book *Savage Peace*:

Operations other than war (OOTW) cannot be avoided or wished away. With millions of American citizens active in countries around the world and billions of U.S. dollars at work in every far corner, some idyllic retreat into Fortress America is not even worth considering. The pace and scale of OOTW commitments may ebb or flow, but they will not end. To keep the status quo that makes their country a superpower, Americans will continue to intervene in other countries. Their business is our business. The statecraft comes in figuring which countries demand attention and how much. The present global condition sometimes makes America appear to be like Doctor Ben Casey surveying the ruins of Nagasaki: capable, determined, and overwhelmed. Triage is the name of the game. Not every case can get the same treatment.

Some can be saved more easily than others. Some need an aspirin, others require brain surgery. And a few may be terminal, worthy of sympathy but not salvageable. So OOTW has many faces.⁷

These facts point to a greater need for understanding a broader spectrum of conflict and a much larger definition of just who the enemy is or could be. It should also be a message to all planners and strategists of all services that just going through the motions of the steps of a mission planning process are not going to be sufficient in most situations. You've got to be more creative--"think outside the box." Understanding the conflict and the enemy situation is going to take much more analysis than before because the enemy and the situation are different; much more complex.

The Need to Define "The Enemy's Will"

Most strategic planning processes zero-in on that good old objective of attacking the enemy's will because attacking the enemy's will is an easy concept and one nearly everyone is familiar with. The question that needs to be asked and answered is, "what is the enemy's will?" What do we mean when we say that? It is used all the time in planning and strategy circles and it is briefed to the press and civilian leadership. But what does it mean? It seems to be assumed that everyone just knows. There is an endless list of things it could be: the will of the people (also obscure), the will of the leadership, the will of the government, the will of the fighting forces, the will to fight, the will to compete in the world market, the will to use military force, the will to use terrorism or coercion, the popular will--support developed through the media, the will to compete technologically, the will to carry out guerrilla tactics,

the will to use nuclear/biological/chemical weapons, the national will, the organizational will, etc., etc.

The enemy's will has not become a topic or target of importance because of recent strategic planning issues. Sun Tzu's, Clausewitz', and Fuller's quotes in the introduction underscore the importance of knowing the enemy. That implies knowing its will--as well as you know your own to know the strengths and weaknesses that can be exploited. Knowing the enemy's will has been an object of importance for sometime. Clausewitz' quote implies that war is a battle of will. But that statement does not clear up the confusion that surrounds the understanding of the enemy's will. In analyzing Clausewitz' statement of war, Colonel Dennis Drew, a faculty member of the Air Force's School of Advanced Airpower Studies, along with Dr. Donald Snow highlight the confusion of that quote: "Doing our will is, however, a more complex matter than the quotation may suggest. A good deal of the misunderstanding about the role of force arises from oversimplifying how political and military aspects of war contribute to achieving the imposition of will."⁸ Indeed, understanding the enemy's will and the complexity that accompanies that will is not an easy nut to crack.

Overview

This monograph is about planning strategy for the conduct of military intervention. Using popular, but often misunderstood or misquoted theory from some of the most popular strategic theorists, this monograph attempts to dispel the myth that strategic planning for military intervention is as easy as applying a standard planning process. The purpose of this

monograph is to define the concept of the enemy's will and explain the importance of understanding it; then, to demonstrate that importance using historical examples.

The paper is split into six chapters. Chapter One defines the terms and concepts necessary to understand military intervention and the new spectrum of warfare. The chapter begins by defining a few terms: such as a standard term for warfare, conflict, armed intervention, military operations other than war, peace operations--everything nowadays that involves the use of U.S. military forces--that can be used throughout the monograph to identify what used to be just known as "war."

In the next two chapters, in-depth studies are performed on both the term enemy, and the term will. Chapter Two is an in-depth analysis of the term enemy--to set some boundaries for whose will is going to be attacked. Along with defining the term enemy, a look at the spectrum of conflict will help to define who future enemies could be. Lending a hand in these definitions will be Carl Von Clausewitz, who provided a valuable framework for understanding war, countries and organizations; as well as John Warden, who also provided a framework for understanding and analyzing an enemy.

Following the definition of the enemy will be the break-down of the term will in Chapter Three. Using dictionary as well as some common theoretical definitions, will is broken into common descriptions used to categorize the types of will existing in a country or other type of organized entity. A sample method for analysis of will and the elements of power is presented to further the explanation. The chapter closes with an identification of the importance of analysis of the enemy's will to develop the strategy to defeat the enemy.

In Chapter Four, the two terms enemy and will are put together to analyze, from a theoretical standpoint, the importance of knowing the enemy's will for the military planner and strategist. That provides a smooth transition into the next chapter--a brief look at history and the targeting of the enemy's will. The fifth chapter of the paper is a look at how history validates the theory provided in the first four chapters by providing historical examples. The final chapter is the conclusion of the paper stressing again the importance of using proper planning strategy and knowing the enemy's will.

Analysis of the enemy and knowing his will are the most important steps--the foundation, the bedrock--to the development of every intervention plan put forth. No one is saying that analysis of the enemy does not take place--it does. It is the first step of every strategic planning process in the Department of Defense. But often, either because of the speed necessary to produce the plan or the lack of assembling all the information from each of the different planning services intelligence organizations--or simply whittling-down the voluminous information to provide a ten-minute summary to the Commander-In-Chief (CINC)--the understanding of the enemy and his will is brushed over for other more pressing issues.

Sun Tzu's point about knowing the enemy is to know the enemy so thoroughly and so well that you can think like the enemy, plan like the enemy, fight like the enemy; to know that enemy as well as you know yourself--to know that enemy's will. Only then, will you know the enemy's strengths and weaknesses to defend against the strengths, and exploit the weaknesses to achieve victory and the fulfillment of the determined end-state and objectives.

This idea of attacking the enemy's will can be pretty hard to get one's hands around. Therefore, the mission of the first chapter will be to lay down some basic fundamental concepts

important to the development of just what the enemy's will is (obviously, in order to attack it, one must know what it is).

Chapter 1: War, Conflict, or Peace Operations--

Defining Military Intervention

"History has seen wars which used up less ammunition than a cease-fire does today"
- Strategist's Quip⁹

"The rise of non-state threats is a tremendous problem for Western governments and militaries because we are legally and behaviorally prepared to fight only other legal-basis states--mirror images of ourselves--at a time when state power and substance is declining worldwide."

- Ralph Peters, "The Culture of Future Conflict"¹⁰

It seems more and more these days the term war is becoming outdated. Much of what involves armed forces, especially for Americans, is much different than the battlefield conflicts that took place many years ago. When discussing the use of military forces in today's scenarios, it seems as though anything goes. US military forces have been used for forest fires, drug interdiction, oil tanker protection, show of force demonstrations, humanitarian reasons (such as hostage rescue, digging potatoes to save a money crop, hurricane recovery situations), all the way to the conduct of large scale-war. It is difficult to just say war anymore. So, to make this monograph more modern, purposeful, and accurate; all concepts that refer to the use of military forces will fall under the term military intervention.

Richard Haase, former National Security Council member during the Bush Administration defines military intervention in his book, *Intervention*, as: "The introduction or deployment of new or additional combat forces to an area for specific purposes that go beyond ordinary training or scheduled expressions of support for national interests."¹¹ Certainly, this is more in line with what's happening in the world today--and

toward tomorrow. He goes on to say that this term links the older forms of military activity--the "classic" form (i.e. war, or armed conflict)--with more modern ideas about the use of military forces. The term military intervention can cover the gamut from the use of military forces for humanitarian intervention situations like Rwanda or Operation Provide Comfort, all the way to armed warfare like Desert Storm.

When the term war was coined, who would have thought that forces, designed for military purposes, would be used in peacetime for peaceful purposes? Did Napoleon foresee the use of his Grand Armee as providing food and supplies to starving refugees? Did Lincoln dream of one day providing hurricane relief to South Carolina residents with Union forces? How about the Kaiser sending out troops from the First Reich to put out forest fires in the black forests of Bavaria? Not likely.

The great debate about maintaining standing armies that takes place in *The Federalist Papers*¹² is all about creating military forces only when necessary and only for military purposes--having a military only when a military need exists. The idea of maintaining a large, high-tech, highly trained, on-call, force projection military for the entire range from peace through to war-time military purposes is one that has evolved in modern times. This evolution is sure to continue, and get further and further from the old concept of wartime armies

Summary of Chapter One

When a planner or strategist today looks back on history to draw lessons from all the great wars and battles that took place, they begin to get that lean and hungry look about

how to best smash the enemy with a tremendous blow to achieve a bold and decisive victory. But, using force to achieve that decisive battle is only a small part of the flexible planning strategy tools today's military planners need in their toolkit. Military intervention situations today have grown into a much larger beast that possesses a fistful of guns, rockets, bombs, and lasers in one hand, and food, medical supplies, hugs and teddy-bears in the other. That is why today's U.S. military forces must be ready for military intervention, rather than just war. It is what the nation demands and expects...what the service part is all about. War or peace, anytime the military is being considered for use, planners must be ready for military intervention. Whether the weapons are bombs and bullets, or bandages and blankets, the objective for the planner is victory.

In these modern times, where military interventions are so prevalent, these operations require a strategy that still involves determination and will. Clausewitz, stated this so many years ago in his discussion of the nature of war or conflict: "war is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will...to impose our will on the enemy."¹³ Therefore, as a natural extension of this theory, anytime there is conflict and the need for intervention, there is a battle or contest of will. Success in the intervention comes down to protecting our own will, and successfully attacking the enemy's will. But just what is the enemy's will? To understand "the enemy's will," we must first define the two terms involved in the concept. Let's take a more in-depth look at this concept by first breaking up, and defining these two terms.

Chapter 2: The Enemy

*We must look upon our enemy as a bold and intelligent antagonist who will make the utmost use of his means as influenced by the conditions.*¹⁴

- J. F. C. Fuller

In today's world of military interventions, the concept of the enemy's will has gotten almost out of hand. How does one define something that has gotten so nebulous--we have gangs, drug-lords, criminal organizations, and tribal warfare. Where do you draw the line? The simplest way to start is by searching the dictionary to define both enemy and will. Enemy appears to be the simpler of the two terms. A dictionary definition is "a hostile power or force; an adversary."¹⁵ The 1996 draft edition of Army Field Manual (FM) Operational Terms and Graphics, defines the enemy as: "The individual, group of individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military force, national entity, or national alliance that is in opposition to the United States, its allies, and/or multinational partners."¹⁶ This military definition provides no implication of evil--the enemy is simply the force that is against our forces--the belligerent force. In today's spectrum of conflict, the enemy may be anything from a street-gang, a drug-cartel, a cultural/ethnic/religious group or tribe, a third-world country, a budding super-power, all the way to a multi-national coalition. The point is the enemy may or may not be the familiar nation-state with a military force.

While the new concept of the enemy is much written and talked about, U.S. military ideology still likes to keep the enemy in a nice, neat, nineteenth-century, nation-state model for simplicity and planning's sake. This may keep training doctrine simpler, and

easier to teach, but it certainly gives planners and strategists a false sense of security when it comes to analyzing the complex modern enemy. In the modern world of military intervention, the enemy is a much more lucid and difficult to define. Consider these words from Ralph Peters in his thought provoking article, "*After the Revolution*:"

Far from the conventionally armed and recognizably structured forces our analysts stretch to imagine as future opponents, we confront, today, creatively organized enemies employing behaviors and technologies ranging from those of the stone-age to those at the imagination's edge...In much of the world, the nation-state is becoming irrelevant. From Columbia to Russia, traditional structures of government coexist nervously with emerging systems of resource allocation and human organization, from techno-capable crime networks to the machete-swinging clans of warlords, from Russian anarch-capitalism through economic migrations to the re-emergence of the city-state in places such as Cali, Sarajevo, and Kabul...more and more governments are being overwhelmed by, run by, or supplanted by an astonishing variety of criminal organizations and innovative structures for controlling wealth through violence and coercion.¹⁷

The point here is obvious, but often shunned when the detailed planning and analysis step roles around in the intervention planning process--the concept of the enemy is no longer an easy or simple one. It is not the Soviet Union, communism, the Nazis, the Confederate States, or the Grand Armee--the well understood armies we are used to fighting. It is a fascinating combination of political, economic, military, informational, cultural, religious, criminal, hostile, social, righteous forces--a combination of which requires careful and detailed analysis (more about the importance of detailed analysis of the enemy's will at the conclusion of this chapter).

The Enemy Entity

Rather than detailing every description of an enemy as to whether it is an ethnic group or a world power, the term “strategic entity”¹⁸ will be used to simplify this detailed concept. This concept provides the flexibility to touch on any or all of the members of the modern spectrum of conflict--from crime to all-out total war. A strategic entity is: “anything that can function on its own and is free and able to make decisions as to where it will go and what it will do--a state, a business organization, a terrorist organization--has elements of both the physical and the biological, but at the center of these whole systems and of every subsystem is a human being who gives direction and meaning.”¹⁹ Therefore, an entity can be any of the possible enemies described above--a gang, a company, a drug cartel, a terrorist group, and so on.

But what makes the entity a “strategic” one? If the U.S. National Command Authority (NCA) is forced to develop policy or make decisions or rulings toward a particular entity, that entity logically becomes a strategic entity. As we have seen in recent events and recent years, many of the previously described entities are enemies the U.S. has taken action against and, in some cases, intervened militarily. From the drug cartels in Columbia, to the warlords in Somalia, each of these enemies are strategic entities. Therefore, for simplification and ease of description, strategic entity can be used to describe an enemy, be it small or large. Now that we have definitions and a descriptive term for the enemy, the logical next step is to understand the parts of an enemy.

The Parts of the Enemy

Each entity is composed of several parts and these parts have an overall effect on the whole. The enemy is not made up of one part, but rather of several. Clausewitz was one of the first to identify and describe the different parts of an entity in order to further understand the whole enemy. He described the “state” as a people, a government, and an army.²⁰




Fig. 1 The Three Parts of a Strategic Entity

There are those who believe these three parts of the enemy entity that Clausewitz describes are what is meant as his “trinity,” but that is incorrect.²¹ These are simply the three parts of an enemy as he describes them. The trinity applies to “the three elements of war,” which must be understood and overlaid onto the three parts of the enemy. This will be more fully explained in the later section which deals with the will.

Sun Tzu also alluded to these three same parts in his description of the “moral law.”²² Other military theorists have also dealt with these same parts of the enemy. But to extend that thought, the three parts are not just applicable to a nation-state, they can be applied to any of today’s possible entities. If the enemy entity is a street gang, there is leadership,

followership, and an armed force of some kind. The same is true for a drug-cartel, a world economic organization, religious groups, tribal groups, ethnic groups, a multi-country coalition. Whatever the entity, the three parts are there in some form or fashion.

Still, there are other theorists who believe even more parts of an enemy exist and that to attack an enemy properly, each of these parts must be developed and analyzed.

Analysis of the Enemy Entity using the Theory “*The Enemy as a System*”

Analysis of the enemy and development of warfighting strategy and process are subjects of military theory that are very much in vogue. While each service undergoes the doctrinal rigors of honing and refining a process, debate continues about how to, and which one is the best. Obviously each service has selected their chosen process for a particular reason--that the chosen process more accurately reflects the capability of that service. Nonetheless, strategy and process have dominated the agenda in military periodicals, lectures, conferences, and at command and staff schools. The focus of discussion is how strategy theory has had to adapt to meet the needs of late twentieth century military intervention. As late twentieth century modern warfighting strategists or theorists go, none has generated as much interest or controversy as now retired Air Force Colonel John Warden.

A little known voice in the wilderness until his vision for an air campaign became the “Instant Thunder” air plan for Operation Desert Storm, Warden’s theories and ideas became the focus and center of attention, not just for the Air Force, but for all of the military establishment. With his assault through books, periodicals, and personal lectures,

Warden ignited an area of military emphasis and challenged the conventional wisdom of how to develop a war-fighting strategy, and more importantly for this paper, how to think of an enemy.

In his often quoted article, "*The Enemy as a System*," John Warden provides a simplified framework for examining the totality of the enemy entity. The concept centers around the theory that "strategic war will force the enemy state or organization to do what you want it to do."²³ By viewing the enemy as a system--a whole comprised of working parts--rather than just a military force or a ruling bureaucracy, the strategist determines to find the enemy critical centers of gravity that can be attacked to force enemy capitulation.

To clarify, he uses the example of the solar system: "If some group wanted to destroy the solar system, it could do so by attacking and destroying each planet-or, it could simply destroy the sun...With the sun gone, or its gravity blocked, all the planets would fly off into outer space and the solar system would be history."²⁴ Warden uses other examples like the body--relating that the most effective way to deal with the body is not by attacking the hands, the feet, or the legs, but by attacking the head, cutting it off from the rest of the body.²⁵

The design of Warden's model is to arrange the enemy entity, based on in-depth analysis, into its identifiable parts. Obviously these parts could go on forever, especially for some entities. So to simplify, Warden establishes large categories for these parts. These categories are what Warden refers to as centers of gravity. Warden defines a center of gravity as "that point where the enemy is most vulnerable and the point where an attack

will have the best chance of being decisive.”²⁶ These centers of gravity within the enemy entity are the “critical vulnerabilities” that most enemy entities possess.²⁷

Warden identifies five of these centers of gravity which, he states “are also rings of vulnerability...absolutely critical to the functioning” of the enemy entity.²⁸ The five centers of gravity, or rings of the model are: leadership; organic essentials, such as energy, food, oil, and money; infrastructure, such as roads, airfields, factories, transmission lines; population; and military forces (see figure 2.).²⁹ These rings have a priority. The most important, or “most critical” ring, leadership, is in the center, with the others in descending order of priority extending outward.³⁰




Fig. 2 Warden's Five Strategic Rings

One of Warden's key points to this theory is the center ring. He states that it is the only center of gravity that “can make concessions,”³¹ and therefore, being the most important, demands the greatest consideration. He points out further: “wars through history have been fought to change...or to induce the command structure to make concessions. Capturing or killing the state's leader has frequently been decisive.”³² With

leadership being the “brain” of the entity, by forcing capitulation of the leadership, one has essentially forced capitulation of the entity.

Another means of attacking the center ring is to attack all of the outer rings to force the enemy entity’s leadership to become “impotent.” But the best of all possible strategies is to attack all of the rings at the same time with impunity. The centers of gravity, which are unique to each entity, can be categorized using the five ring model whether it’s a nation-state, or a drug cartel (see figure 3).

	BODY	STATE	DRUG CARTEL	ELECTRIC GRID
LEADERSHIP	BRAIN, EYES, NERVES	GOV'T, COMM SYSTEMS	LEADER, SECURITY	CENTRAL TRANSFORMER
ORGANIC ESSENTIALS	FOOD, OXYGEN (CONVERTED)	OIL, FOOD, ELEC MONEY	COCA SOURCE, CHEM CONVT	HYDRO, COAL, NUCLEAR
INFRA-STRUCTURE	VESSELS, BONES MUSCLE	ROADS, AIRFDS FACTORIES	ROAD, AIR & SEA PORTS	TRANSMN LINES
POPULATION	CELLS	PEOPLE	GROWERS, DIST, PROCESSORS	WORKERS
FIGHTING MECHANISM	LEUKOCYTES	MP'S, POLICE NAT'L GUARD	HIRED SOLDIERS	REPAIRMEN

Fig. 3 Different Systems vs. 5-Rings Analysis³³

By attacking these centers of gravity, preferably all at the same time (a theory Warden calls parallel warfare) and by inflicting decisive blows, the enemy enters into a state of strategic systems shock or paralysis, from which it is no longer able to function in a war-fighting capacity.³⁴




Fig 4 Warden's Strategic Attack Using Parallel Warfare

Analysis of "The Enemy as a System" Process

By using the five-ring model, a strategist or planner can develop an adequate understanding of the enemy entity, as well as formulate an idea for courses of action which must be taken to defeat the enemy entity using this simplified format. Warden's five-ring model, which is part of the Air Force's Air Campaign Planning Process, is just one of the many strategy and planning processes being used to develop an understanding of the enemy and formulate courses of action to be taken in military intervention situations. Like Warden's model, the other service planning processes provide a simplified means to examine the enemy entity and the situation; then based on the analysis of the strategic situation and an understanding of the political, economic, and military objectives, formulate the strategy. They all act as universal solutions to a common goal--victory. But

like Warden's five rings, they each run the risk of over-simplifying the understanding of the enemy by trying to make the enemy entity into fit the process, rather than fitting the process to meet the enemy.

The Weapon System Emphasis

There are a few pitfalls with Warden's otherwise comprehensive theory. The first is that Warden designed this theory around the use and development of air power (like the other services design theirs around their own systems). So, this theory comes with some baggage. Hidden between the lines is a justification of setting the record straight on the use of air power from its earlier promises of dominance and ability to win wars all by itself--an image problem shared by many planners and strategists in the Air Force today.

Indeed, Warden freely admits even to this day that the Instant Thunder air campaign he designed for Desert Storm would have won the war outright if given more time to proceed, and if sorties had not been siphoned away from the strategic attack role to support the ground offensive. This action would have been a thorough and true vindication of the previous failures of air power prophets to dominate decisively, and win a war all by itself. But it did not happen that way, nor could it. The reason: no single means of intervention can win all by itself--not to mention ignoring the multiplied effect of massing absolutely all resources (diplomatic, economic, informational, as well as military) possible for a truly combined effort.

Thus, there is one message that Warden's theory of parallel warfare muffles: there are other ways to win wars and interventions besides dropping precision-guided bombs on

the enemy entities headquarters--the technology of choice when Warden developed this theory. Warden states: "All components can attack centers of gravity, but only air power can frequently circumvent enemy forces and attack strategic centers of gravity directly. Other components, on the other hand, need to fight their way in--normally with large casualties...Air power then becomes quintessentially an American form of war."³⁵ The bias is there and it is obvious.

Other service processes also carry technological and weapon systems baggage to a lesser or greater degree. Because of the "our systems are better" parochialism and the plans that are drawn up in a vacuum apart from the other services, the real good idea of using the right force in the right situation--the right thing to do--rarely occurs even though its said to. Warden's theory, along with the other service's planning processes, work well for high-tech, highly-capable, highly maneuverable, attack-oriented, seize-the-initiative warriors who are looking for the next big war to win. But, since there has only been a relative few of those types of military interventions for the U.S. in the last ninety-seven years compared with the dozens of smaller intervention situations establishing themselves as the norm, it seems the focus of developing planning processes is backwards. An analogy comes to mind of making the larger peg fit into a smaller hole, rather than putting a smaller peg in a larger hole, and filling in around it as necessary. It seems more logical to have a process that works for smaller intervention situations and expand it as necessary to fit larger interventions when and if needed.

Warden's Physical Emphasis

The final, and more important pitfall in Colonel Warden's theory is its failure to answer the questions "how" and "why." His analytical framework provides a way to dissect the physical parts of the enemy entity and answer the questions "who" and "what," but it falls short of analyzing why that entity is a belligerent, and what is the motivation to cause the need for intervention. What if the leader is just a figurehead with dozens of other prospective leaders waiting in the wings for their shot? What if the real decision making power lies with the military, or with the people? What if the enemy entity survives on a little rat-meat, a rice-ball, and stolen ammunition--like in a guerrilla war situation?

Warden does mention that "morale forces" can be important, but then quickly dismisses those important elements as "beyond the realm of prediction" and therefore, untargetable. Warden states, "we attain our objectives by causing such changes to one or more parts of the enemy's physical system then the enemy decides to adopt our objectives, or we make it physically impossible for him to oppose us."³⁶ This may be possible for an enemy who is, like us, very dependent on physical "stuff." But as described earlier in this chapter, there are many different enemies out there today who are not that dependent on physical stuff. Also, because of rules of engagement, the concern for civilian casualties, and a multitude of other restrictions, the enemy's physical stuff may not be targetable. What then--do we just not intervene?

In the beginning of his article Warden advises planners and strategists: "To become good operational artists and strategists, however, we must learn to think deductively...we must focus on the totality of our enemy."³⁷ But it's obvious that the balance of Warden's

theory is focused on the physical side. This is also true of other service planning processes. Unfortunately, this focus on the physical will not provide the kind of analysis necessary to defeat the uncommon, asymmetric enemy entity. Warden's process, like the others, analyzes the enemy physically, but not mentally and spiritually. If one is to really "know the enemy" as Sun Tzu suggests, then these other factors which determine will--these moral factors as Clausewitz and Fuller call them, must be just as important--if not more so. It is important to analyze the entire enemy entity and **know its will**. This monograph will demonstrate in chapter three that the enemy's will can be analyzed--especially if the strategy is to attack the enemy's will.

Summary of Chapter Two

The concept of the enemy for today and into the future is certainly different. No longer is it just that other military force sitting across in the foxhole. The new enemy is an entity that can range from a natural disaster, to a criminal, to a tribal warrior, to a hired thug, to a mighty nation-state. Whatever the enemy entity is, it is not a single one-celled unit. Today's enemy entity is a system--a whole made up of parts. To understand the whole entity, one must understand the parts of the entity. Once that entity is known, only then can the strategy to defeat that entity be developed.

One planning process that is designed to facilitate understanding an enemy entity is the Five-Rings theory put forth by John Warden. Warden's theory provides a framework from which to help understand the entity's system, and identify enemy critical vulnerabilities to attack. Warden's theory and process, like many of the other processes

for strategic planning development (while they all may not openly admit it), are directed at attacking the enemy's physical capabilities--to force the enemy to concede, capitulate, or run the risk of being annihilated. There is nothing wrong with that idea so long as the planner realizes that there is more to the enemy than just the physical part--especially if the enemy is not the common military force as it is so often conceived.

The enemy might be a disease, a plague, a natural disaster, a business organization, a tribe, a cult, or some group of undefinable qualities. No matter, the long term objectives must also focus on the end-state, and the situation that follows--so that the military intervention's cause will have a more lasting effect. Therefore, if the objective is going to be to target the enemy's will, then the next step is to define and understand what the enemy's will is.

Chapter 3: The Will

It's not the size of the dog in the fight, but the size of the fight in the dog!

- Knute Rockne

Asymmetrical threats will continue to challenge our national security and economic security, for our adversaries realize only these have a chance to succeed...because America's conventional military forces are so devastatingly capable, no potential adversary wants to fight the United States or its allies on the conventional battlefield.

- James M. Dubik, "Sacred Cows Make Good Shoes"³⁸

What causes a small man, or small organization, or small country to take on an entity that is so much larger, so much more equipped, there is almost no hope for victory--only certain defeat? The answer--will; the second of the two terms that make-up the concept of the enemy's will to define and examine. There are (pun intended) many ways to attack this subject; the simplest is to check a dictionary definition first. Interestingly, the dictionary definitions are numerous and varied. Many deal with things like "volition--an act of willing or choosing," or "choice." But in keeping with our theme of defining the enemy's will, the three areas of focus are: 1-- "something desired or decided by a person of authority or supremacy; (the leader or government; ruling body)" 2-- "the collective desire of a given group, (the people or populous; followers)" 3-- "to influence or induce by sheer force," (such as military action; military body or force).³⁹

But the dictionary is not the only definition. Many of the military theorists have defined or referred to the will as well. Sun Tzu wrote about will over two thousand years ago in his analysis of the Moral Law-- "causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger."⁴⁰ Sun Tzu also dealt with the will in his strategy of the Sheathed Sword--

“supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance (will) without fighting. In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is no good.”⁴¹ This strategy identifies the importance of trying to overcome, at first, the enemy’s will using every other means possible but fighting. Then, if it’s absolutely necessary to use military force, do it to defeat the plans of the enemy.

J.F.C. Fuller, the British twentieth-century military theorist, who attempted to provide a more modern Clausewitzian approach to theory with his work *The Foundations of the Science of War*, describes will as “the gravity of the mind, it is the motive force which attempts to accomplish reason by cause and effect.”⁴² He links this definition to his idea of the three-fold nature of man--comprised of soul, mind, and spirit. The mind is the determiner of will, with the soul being the inspiration, and the body being the execution enabler: “Will, once set in motion, is directed by purpose, and leads to a definite act.”⁴³ Fuller deals heavily with the concept of will in Chapter VII of his book, entitled “The Moral Sphere of War.”⁴⁴

As mentioned before, Clausewitz states that war is a battle of will: “to impose our will upon the enemy.” To Clausewitz, the will is a moral or psychological factor, and it must always be considered; never overlooked. He describes will as being more important even than the consideration of physical factors in the planning and development of strategy for war:

Fighting, in turn, is a trial of moral and physical factors through the medium of the latter. Naturally moral strength must not be excluded, for psychological forces exert a decisive influence on the elements involved in war...In formulating any rule concerning physical factors, the theorist must bear in mind the part that moral factors may play in it; otherwise he may be

misled into making categorical statements that will be too timid and restricted, or else too sweeping and dogmatic...One might say that the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade.⁴⁵

Certainly, the relative importance placed on this concept by these two important military theorist bear further investigation and explanation.

The Elements of Power

Combining Clausewitz' and Fuller's theories one can deduce the dynamic importance of the concept of will and it's effect in military intervention. Both these theorists understand the importance of the imposition of will upon the enemy. But both also imply certain concepts that are left undescribed. The ability to impose will implies several things. First, there is an implied understanding that the decision to have a military force for conducting warfare constitutes an exercise of will. An entity would not have a military capability if they had not determined to do so. This military capability represents a determination to enter into possible conflict, or, at the very least a hedge against another entity's determination to do so. Secondly, if there is a conflict, one entity has determined that the other entity's will can be overcome. To impose will means one's capability and will is stronger than the other's.

It is at this point where the three parts of the enemy entity come in. In order to impose will upon an enemy, these three parts must be somewhat aligned to a common will and capability. This unifying effect is what is referred to as National Will; or for our purposes, entity will. John Spanier, author of *Games Nations Play*, describes this concept as, "popular dedication to the nation (entity) and support for its policies, even when that support requires sacrifice."⁴⁶ This aligning or unifying effect of having each of the three

parts focused on a particular exercise of will gives the entity elements of power. These elements of power are manifested in particular ways--a combination of diplomatic or political, economic, military, informational, and possibly criminal or terrorist power. The greater the elements of power for an entity are, the greater the capability; and the greater the capability, the greater the possibility of the exercise of the will to defeat an enemy and impose will.

The Moral Factor

The elements of power are not the only thing that add complexity to an enemy entity. Fuller provides other variables which add further complexity to the concept of will. He suggests variables which he calls "other forces." He says: "Though the desired aim in war is to impose one's own will on the enemy, the two wills in conflict are surrounded by a host of other forces."⁴⁷ These "other forces" (he describes these as moral factors) make the analysis of will more difficult because of the complexity of the enemy and the parts of the enemy entity involved. Fuller describes the absolute importance in understanding moral factors in war by stating: "This, indeed, is a tremendous subject, and one requiring the closest study, for, though *moral* is all-important in war, it is not a thing in itself, as it is so frequently considered to be, but a link between will and action."⁴⁸

Clausewitz' Trinity

Clausewitz added complexity to understanding the three parts of all entities when he identified his "remarkable trinity."⁴⁹ He stated that war, or to use our term, military

intervention, is always a remarkable trinity and composed of three elements, “violence and passion; uncertainty, chance, probability; and political purpose.”⁵⁰ Using these three elements, Clausewitz implied that conflict involves *violence*, violent acts, and *passion*. The military’s conduct and the people’s tolerance of this violence and their passion to conduct or remain involved in the conflict will affect the overall entity’s ability to achieve success. *Uncertainty, chance, and probability*, all describe the things that may or may not happen in war; how those things are seen or not seen; and the decisions or actions that are taken or not taken as a result. Finally, the *political purpose and effect* provides the reason or objective for the war--which Clausewitz described as an extension of policy, or “politics by other means.”⁵¹

The three elements of war Clausewitz describes help to develop the will of the enemy by demonstrating the variables of their effects on the three parts of the enemy. These elements may lead to the formulation of the will, or lead to the changing of the will during the conflict. Either way, each of these three elements affects each of the three parts of the enemy entity to a lesser or greater degree, depending on the entity. But also, each can be linked directly or indirectly with the three parts of the entity.

There is much confusion about what is really meant by the phrase “Clausewitz’ Trinity.” It is appropriate for a quick time-out to clarify just what is meant by this phrase. Everyone who has read Clausewitz extensively know that his writing style is both philosophical and empirical. In his work *On War*, he is either one or the other. His pattern is to present philosophical ideals to inspire theoretical thought; then, in order to provide explanation and clarification, he supports those ideals with empirical evidence. In

order to help explain his concept of the trinity, Clausewitz linked violence and passion to the people; uncertainty, chance, and probability to the commander and his forces; and political purpose and effect to the government. He did this to simplify the description and definition. He did not mean to attach these in an iron-clad way, thereby making the trinity government, people, and military. He says: "These three tendencies (the trinity) are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another."⁵² Passion can play as significant part for the leader, or the military, as it can for the people. Certainly any of the elements can and will affect the parts of the entity. The strategist's analysis will reveal to what degree.⁵³

The main point to remember is that government, people, and military are **parts** of the "state" or enemy entity for our purposes: passion, policy, and chance are the "trinity." To link these two together and demonstrate the trinity's affect on the three parts of the enemy entity, we will use the diagram in figure 5.




Fig 5 The Parts of the Enemy Entity affected by Clausewitz' Trinity--the Three Elements of War (Will)

Each of the three parts of the enemy entity have a will, and the will is affected by the three elements of war. These elements of war are not just elements of war in our modern vernacular though, as previously discussed. War in today's terms has transcended to military intervention. In the more modern sense, the elements of war have transcended into elements of something greater--passion, policy, and chance have expanded to apply more to a modern enemy. We can therefore deduce, if war is the imposing of our will upon the enemy, these elements are also elements of will.

The Elements of Will

Understanding these elements of will is the key to understanding the enemy entity and its motivation for conflict. The elements of war that Clausewitz describes--passion, policy, and chance--have grown into a greater representative list of elements that affect will and the motivation to either enter into, or avoid conflict. But what are the elements of will? In modern conflict and military intervention, this list of elements is long and subjective, depending upon the enemy entity. A sample elements of will matrix is provided in Figure 6. This sample matrix provides the elements of will, stacked up against the three parts of the enemy. This represents an important step--to evaluate and analyze how the elements affect the parts of the enemy.

These elements of will presented in Figure 6 must be applied against the three parts of the enemy entity to provide a complete look at the will for cause and effect. These listed elements are just an example and by no means absolute--analysts may provide more

elements or less based on the analysis performed. But Figure 6 does provide a sample of the kinds of elements that merit consideration.

The sample answers in Figure 6 demonstrate that each of the three parts of the enemy entity can work in complete opposition to each other. Each part possesses its own will and may not be the same as any other part. The key to remember is that because you know one or two parts of the enemy's will, doesn't mean you know all of the enemy's will.

The sample answers, which are shorter than in a true analysis, provide an example of how this analysis can be performed. Each enemy entity is different and each analysis will reveal individualities that make the enemy unique. The answers should provide the key to knowing the enemy's will by identifying strengths and weaknesses and also areas of concentration. This allows the planner to get inside of the enemy's planning cycle, and can even fulfill Sun Tzu's idea of attempting to defeat the enemy entity's plan. By performing this type of analysis, a more complete picture of the enemy entity can be developed and Sun Tzu's sage wisdom of knowing the enemy is a reality.

E l e m e n t s o f W i l l	P e o p l e / F o l l o w e r s	G o v e r n m e n t / L e a d e r s	M i l i t a r y / F o r c e s
Political/ Diplomatic	Support Gov't	Dictator-- Self Appointed	Don't Support Gov't
Accepted form of Gov't	Communist	Communist	Authoritarian
Economic	Poor	Wealthy	Poor
Currency	Barter	Gold	Barter
Technological	No-Tech	Med-Tech	Lo-Tech
Industrial	Agrarian	Few Gov't Factories	Can't Produce Weapons
Comm/Info	No Info Proc	Some Info Processing	Some Radio
Religious	Catholic	None	Catholic
Cultural/ Class	Poor Servants	Upper-Class	Low-Class Draftees
Education	20% Literacy	100% Lit	50% Lit
Ethnic	Mixed-race	Spanish	Mixed
Tribal	Mixed	None	Mixed
Geographical	City Slums/ Poor Farms	Affluent Areas/	Poor Military Bases
Radical	none	Castro- Supported	Rebel Trng w / Hezbollah
Criminal	Crime Ridden	Org Crime Within Gov't	Org Crime Influence
Terroistic	Unrest	Threaten Military	Attempted Assassinations
Social Needs	All	Ignore	Most
Psycho Needs	All	Ignore	Most
Survival Needs	All	Legitimacy	Legitimacy
F i n a l E v a l o f W i l l	Poor--No Spt to Mil or Gov't	Strong--will Attempt to Stay	Determined to Oust Gov't
L e v e r a g e D e v i c e s t h a t m a y C h a n g e W i l l	All Basic Need Food, Cloth Shelter, Recreation	Recognition	Improve Basic Needs--Jobs, Food, Cloth, Shelter
T h i n g s t o A v o i d N e g C h a n g e s o f W i l l	Allow Attacks Will Align People w / Gov't	Remove w/o Adequate Replacement	

Fig 6 Elements of Will Matrix

Elements of Power	People/ Followers	Government/ Leaders	Military/ Forces
Diplomatic/ Political Power	Remain Indignant	Oppress People	Attempt Overthrow
Economic Power	Increase Crime Activity	Retain Wealth	Rob Gov't
Military Power	Gang Activity	Use Police For Terror	Con't Attacks on Gov't
Comm/ Info Power	Listen	Control TV, Radio	Rebel Network

Fig 7 Elements of Power Matrix

Once an understanding of the elements of will has been completed, the next step is to analyze how the will is, or may be, manifested through the elements of power. This type of analysis can also be performed through the use of a matrix, because it is important to know how these elements of power will be used by each part of the entity. Figure 7 depicts a sample matrix to analyze the effects of elements of power on the parts of the entity.

Using the elements of will and elements of power matrixes together provides a complete analysis of the enemies capabilities and its will (not just who, what, and where, but also why and how). Again, the matrixes demonstrated here are certainly not the only way to accurately analyze an enemy entity's will. The point is not to provide a doctrinal process but hopefully to develop an understanding of ways in which the enemy entity's will can be analyzed. Once this analysis is performed, only then should a course of action strategy be developed.

Summary of Chapter Three

Will is the complex, unquantifiable variable that affects the enemy entity's ability to engage in conflict. As Clausewitz and Fuller point out, it is a moral factor that is extremely important to understand. By defining will, and examining it through the eyes of these great theorists, hopefully the reader will get the picture that will can provide the map of what is inside of the enemy's mind. Will is a complex factor and important to analyze and understand because it provides the motivation cause and effect. It is the product of each of the three parts of the enemy and is manifested in the demonstration of entity power.

The enemy's will has elements that can be further broken down for in-depth analysis to understand the driving forces of the enemy entity--where it derives its power, what makes it tick, what the strengths and weaknesses are. To know this, to know the enemy's will, is to truly know the enemy. Once this is known it becomes the basis for all other strategic planning. Chapter Four will further illuminate the importance of knowing the enemy's will.

Chapter 4: The Importance of Understanding the Enemy's Will

"The moral is to the physical as three is to one."

- Napoleon Bonaparte

In his quote, Napoleon states the importance of the moral factors--the importance of understanding the enemy's will. This importance comes from a careful analysis. The idea of knowing the enemy's parts, and knowing the elements of will all revert back to Clausewitz key ideals on developing strategy. Peter Paret, the most well-known of the *On War* translators describes how Clausewitz' thesis "creates a basis for the analysis of all acts of organized violence, from wars of annihilation, to armed demonstrations that differ from other diplomatic maneuvers solely by their direct threat of violence. This thesis makes it impossible to consider any one type of war as the norm that should determine policy, the standard by which all wars are measured."⁵⁴

Clausewitz' Warning To Strategists and Planners

Planning for military intervention is a deep and difficult subject area because of the delicate balance of power and the effect of intervention on human lives--possibly millions of them. Clausewitz issues a stern order to those who do not take war or intervention seriously: "War is no pastime; it is no mere joy in daring and winning, no place for irresponsible enthusiasts. It is a serious means to a serious end."⁵⁵ This warning is from someone who knew the truly ugly side of war up close and personal. That is why he implored the strategist to have a clear idea of the political objectives and to understand

that if you enter into a crisis situation, be prepared to go all the way. To think an entity can intervene militarily in moderation is, in Clausewitz terms, “a logical absurdity.”⁵⁶

That is the importance of knowing the theory behind the planning process. Military intervention is not a game... “war is never an isolated act,”⁵⁷... “war does not consist of a single short blow.”⁵⁸ Planners must know their business, for Clausewitz says, “as soon as preparations for war begin, the world of reality takes over from the world of abstract thought.”⁵⁹

Analysis is the key to understanding the enemy’s will--and as previously mentioned, every enemy and every intervention is different. The situational nature of the intervention, combined with the situational nature of the enemy’s will ensures no two interventions will be alike. But there are commonalities to the enemy as an entity. Each of the enemy entities described earlier has three parts to it. A street-gang has a leader, followers, and a force element; so does a terrorist group, a tribal group, and a nation-state. Most importantly though, each of these parts of the entity has a will; both individually and collectively. If you are going to attack the will, which one are you going after--the leader’s, the follower’s, the military force’s--some, all, or none?

These three parts of the enemy entity are factors in the strength and capability of the entity. The enemy’s will is a product of who the enemy is; the sum of the parts combined with the elements. The parts were alluded to in the definition of will from the dictionary and in the earlier section on the enemy entity. As mentioned before, Clausewitz was probably the first to highlight the tri-polar parts of any strategic entity in his analysis of war--and those parts are every bit as applicable today. Overlay the elements of will,

developed from an extension of Clausewitz' trinity and the totality of the enemy entity now comes into clear focus.

The importance of understanding these elements and their play on the three parts of the strategic entity cannot be overstated for the planner or strategist. Once again, Paret describes the importance Clausewitz placed on a proper strategy based on analysis of the parts of the enemy and the understanding of the elements of will: "To analyze war in general or to understand a particular war, but also to plan or conduct a war, requires the study or the exploitation of all of these elements. A theory or policy would be flawed if it ignored any one of them, or paid attention only to some of their component parts."⁶⁰ Truly, Paret's emphasis raises the importance of understanding the elements of war to "must do" items for the planner or strategist.

Summary of Chapter Four

These thoughts, theories, and strategic planning ideals dispel the myth that strategic planning can be done simply and easily by using a one-size-fits-all process. The importance of the theories included in this discussion underline the importance of understanding that strategy and planning are to be conducted not by those who are lightly trained in a two-week planning course, but by the highly educated based upon years of study of military theory and doctrine. There is much more to the common enemy that what jumps off a "facts on file" briefing sheet.

By analyzing and understanding the enemy entity's three parts and studying the effects of the elements of will, only then can the enemy entity be known in total and only

then can further planning and strategy be conducted. Analysis of the enemy entity's will is the foundation of the strategy for military intervention, the bedrock that courses of action are based upon. If is more important than knowing the enemy's will, it is a misplaced priority.

For a planner to think they can use a simple planning process without a theoretical base is pure folly. Yet, as history points out so many times, military interventions are conducted without a thorough understanding of the situation, and especially without a complete knowledge of the enemy and the enemy's will. Many times throughout history, the target has been to attack the enemy's will, but it is clear that the enemy's will was not known or understood.

Chapter 5: When Theory Meets History

"Strategy is not merely the art of preparing for the armed conflicts in which a nation may become involved and planning the use of its resources and the deployment of its forces in such a way as to bring a successful issue. It is also, in a broader sense, the modern equivalent of what was, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, called ragione di stato or raison d'etat. It is the rational determination of a nation's vital interests, the things that are essential to its security, its fundamental purposes in its relations with other nations, and its priorities with respect to goals. This broader form of strategy should animate and guide the narrower strategy of war planning and war fighting, and Clausewitz implied as much in the famous statement cited at the outset of these observations."

- Peter Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy*⁶¹

Strategy for military intervention should be based on a crystal clear understanding of the enemy. But an analysis of America's recent history in military interventions since World War II suggests something different--that concept isn't followed. Recent observations point to the idea that since the victories in Europe and Japan of World War II, the U.S. military's success in interventions has been anything but stellar. Rhetorical lines such as "we're one, one and one" (meaning one win-the Gulf, one loss-Vietnam, and one tie-Korea), indicate that since Victory in Europe (VE) and Victory in Japan (VJ) days, the U.S. has had problems entering into military interventions and achieving its objectives. Interventions such as Korea, Vietnam, and Somalia actually demonstrate a severe lack of intestinal fortitude for follow-through on commitments, blacken the eye of U.S. international policy, and lead to a defunct strategy of "if things don't work out, just get out." The "just get out" strategy stems from a lack of clear understanding in two particular areas: one of the political objective; and two, the enemy's will.

America's Way of War

With apologies to Russell Weigley, the military historian who wrote the classic book, *The America Way of War*, America's way of war is no longer annihilation or attrition. The real way of war for American military forces is attacking the enemy's will--has been ever since the Civil War. Weigley's theory just happens to be correct for the major wars following the Civil War. The Civil War, World War I, and World War II were all gradual escalation to near total war with greater and greater influence on destruction. This was caused in greatest part by technology, which made greater physical destruction more possible, more achievable, and more fascinating. This fascination with technology allowed strategists to believe they could make war shorter through the use of technology on a greater scale to destroy the enemy, and destroy his will to continue the fight. Few of the technological improvements would have been possible if it weren't for the near total war conditions of the three great wars.

After the Civil War, it was realized that huge armies, rifled shooting devices, and industrialized supply brought by rail were going to make the next war a tremendously costly one, in terms of lives and destruction. But the advances of the Civil War brought about by technology enabled greater destruction of the enemy and inched the world closer toward total war--which was thought to be more decisive. Certainly, the First World War was the most costly ever with over 37 million casualties of the 61 million participants.

By the time World War II rolled around, it was determined by both civilian and military leaders that war should be moved from just attacking military forces, to taking the war to entire homelands--using the successful strategy of the "indirect approach"⁶² that

was used in the Civil War. The strategy was to attack the enemy's will to bring an end to the fight by destroying not just the military forces, but also the people and the government.

The Strategy of Strategic Attack

Led by theorists such as Giulio Douhet, strategists determined that more efficient warfare can be conducted by destroying the enemy's will to fight through the use of strategic attack--massive firepower deep in the enemy's rear on strategic targets--thereby forcing defeat quicker and more easily. Michael Howard describes the essence of this strategy:

There were the prophets of air power, of whom the most articulate was the Italian Giulio Douhet, who believed that surface operations could be eliminated altogether by attacks aimed directly at the morale of the civilian population, a population who would, if its cities were destroyed around it, rise up and compel its governments to bring the war to an end.⁶³

Armed with a strategy that featured air power, bombing raids were launched from the sky to attack whole cities and attempt to force the enemy to surrender or give up. As Colonel Everest Riccioni wrote in his article "Strategic Bombing: Always a Myth," that despite the incredible devastation delivered onto Tokyo, Japan remained firm in its efforts to prosecute the war:

Jelled-gasoline incendiary bombs, dropped on Japan's highly combustible cities, generated ferocious firestorms called conflagrations. The greatest number of deaths ever generated within six hours came from fire-bombing 15 square miles of Tokyo. Neither nuclear drop matched this. Despite the deviation, however, there still were no solid indications of Japanese surrender.⁶⁴

Instead of having its intended impact, strategic attack simply steeled the will of both Germany and Japan. As Howard points out: "Bombing, in its early stages, in fact did a great deal to *improve* civilian morale."⁶⁵ Clearly, the American bombing campaign planner's strategy of conventional bombing destroying the will of the enemy was not a direct hit (pun intended). This may have been as a result of a misunderstanding of the capabilities of conventional bombing, or a lack of understanding of the will of the enemy (again, whose will--the people's, the government's or the military's?). Still, the bombing continued--but it was soon to take another form.

The outer boundary of this theory of strategic attack affecting the will of the enemy in a near total war scenario came in the form of the atomic bomb. The use of the atomic bombs finally did cause the Emperor to succumb. But the use of this weapon of mass destruction brought to a close the idea of using the destructive capability enabled by total war to destroy the enemy, and its will, to force capitulation. The nuclear age generated a reorientation in the idea of destroying the enemy, the homeland, and everything else that affects the will because the escalation into an all-out nuclear exchange borders on the unthinkable. A change in strategy was in order as Weigley points out: "since nuclear weapons had made the destruction of the enemy too literally possible, the principal aim of strategy had shifted from destroying the enemy to hurting him (to affect his will), enough to coerce him into doing something;"⁶⁶ --like giving-up.

Despite its lack of success in World War II, American strategist continued to have a full-blown love affair with air power and strategic attack. The view of the strategists, according to Mark Clodfelter, author of "*The Limits of Air Power*," was "that strategic

bombing--aimed at a country's warmaking potential rather than its deployed armed forces--could destroy not only the *capability* of an enemy to wage war but also the enemy's *will* to fight."⁶⁷ **The myopia that occurred for American war planning strategists was an inverse application of strategy: you don't develop a strategy (strategic attack) to fit every war or intervention situation and every enemy, then overuse that strategy to attempt to affect the enemy's will. Rather, you develop a strategy based on the enemy and the situation with an understanding of the enemy's will, then tailor and flex the necessary force to execute the strategy.** The tell-tale sign of this problem was the performance of American forces in the so-called "limited wars"--Korea and Vietnam.

Even though strategic attack had mixed reviews following World War II, it became the eventual strategy of choice for both Korea and Vietnam. While there was much use of ground forces in both conflicts, air power was looked upon to deliver the strategic blows that would destroy the enemy's will and bring both wars to a close. American leaders had developed faith in air power's ability to deliver the decisive blow based upon the overblown ideas of air power proponents who promised more than could be delivered. As Clodfelter points out, this buoyed a false sense of security in American leaders about the capabilities of air power:

What it has done, however, is to create a modern vision of air power that focuses on the lethality of its weaponry rather than on that of the weaponry's effectiveness as a political instrument. American civilian and military leaders entered Vietnam convinced that bombing's lethality assured political results. They never fully realized that air power's political efficacy varies according to many diverse elements, and that no specific formula guarantees success. Indeed, if judged by their reluctance to face up to it, this lesson might prove the most difficult of all for air leaders to learn.⁶⁸

Summary for Chapter Five

There is much to learn in this lesson for all planners and strategists--not just air power ones. The strategic attack lesson is just one of many from the annals of American Military Strategic Planning Dogma. The reason strategic attack was selected as the dogma tool or example was to make a point about strategy. Certainly, strategy dogma could be studied in the other service's poor performances. Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of Grenada, is another example of poor strategy where the Army, Navy, and Marines all failed to get on the same team, fighting nearly independent actions and achieving victory despite a host of critical errors. Strategy applied universally as a means to affect every intervention situation everywhere is not strategy...it is dogma. Strategy should not be formulated from pre-packaged processes, or performed by lightly educated trainees. Planning strategy is as individual as the situation and the enemy, and requires careful and in-depth analysis done by planners who know the art and science of their craft.

Strategy's basis and formulation must come from an understanding of the analysis process performed on the intervention situation and the will of the enemy entity. As mentioned before, analysis is the foundation, the bedrock of the development of the strategy and courses of action. History demonstrates over and over that America has not learned that lesson well. Mistakes in understanding the importance of knowing the situation, and knowing the enemy entity's will abound for the student of U.S. military history and theory.

Truly, history validates the need for developing expert planners and strategists who can develop proper military intervention strategies and plans based on a thorough analysis

Chapter 6: Conclusion

"A nation that does not prepare for all the forms of war should then renounce the use of war in national policy. A people that does not prepare to fight should then be morally prepared to surrender. To fail to prepare soldiers and citizens for limited, bloody ground action, and then to engage in it, is folly verging on the criminal."
-T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War*⁶⁹

Is America adequately prepared for military intervention situations across the entire spectrum of conflict? Fehrenbach's words should sound an alarm to all in the profession of arms and the country's governmental appointees, of the self-inspection that is mandatory to determine just how prepared the military services are. This gut-check covers the gamut of possible operations and every servicemember from combat arms, to logistical supporters, to strategists and planners.

In the introduction to this monograph, a spoof appeared on the military planning process entitled "The McConflict Planning Process." This is a light-hearted attempt to point out the fast-food approach that appears to be occurring with regard to the American military planning processes for military intervention situations throughout the world. In planning training scenarios, often times the strategy free-flows into the simplified process that each service has developed. Rather than performing a truly in-depth analysis on the enemy, the objective for the intervention situation baselessly becomes "we're going to attack the enemy's will by..." How is that known the reader might ask? The author has witnessed this event numerous times.

That is the reason for this paper. There are many so-called planners and strategists out in the planning world who automatically assume they have a strategy to fight any scenario without knowing what the enemy's will is--without ever seeing an explanation or

definition--much less performing an analysis on the subject. That is gravely unfortunate because this lack of understanding affects not only the situation for which they may be planning, but the future of strategic planning and development for all the services, and for all future intervention situations.

In these modern times of military intervention, the enemy's will must be known and understood; not just so we have a better way of attacking it, but so we know whether or not we have enough will to do what it takes to achieve the objective, accept all of the costs, and achieve lasting effects. The point to remember is the enemy has a vote on what is going to happen. The strategist and planner need to determine what that vote is, or their plan becomes faulty.

To help develop a better understanding of the enemy, and the enemy's will a good deal of military theory was tossed around in the preceding chapters. There is a reason for that--there is a lot out there which helps to identify the importance of strategic planning and ways it can be done. Some of this theory came from the original guru on strategic military planning--Carl Von Clausewitz. Why? Because Clausewitz is, as Peter Paret and Bernard Brodie describe, the biggest of the big when it comes to military theory. Brodie says Clausewitz is,

the first great creative figure in modern strategy, just as Adam Smith is the first great figure in modern economics, a science that is in many respects remarkably analogous...Clausewitz stands alone in his eminence...There were thinkers and writers on strategy before Clausewitz, just as there were thinkers and writers on economics before Adam Smith, but their approach was generally fragmentary and they dealt with long-since-vanished conditions. The talented military leader managed usually to know what he was about and why. This priceless insight made up for a lack of comprehensive, coherent theory.⁷⁰

A lot of what Clausewitz has to say about strategic planning has relevance even today, so he is the theorist most heavily counted on to carry the explanitive load in this monograph. There are also wealth of other theorists who cover strategic planning. Some of their ideas are included also.

Whether it is war, OOTW, peace operations, or whatever the term of the month is, military intervention is going to happen--the current administration is already demonstrating that. To plan and prepare properly for military intervention, an analysis of the enemy entity and its will must take place. This statement is not a simple one. The enemy entity is a whole composed of parts. Each of these parts must be fully analyzed as well. Next, its important to understand the elements of the enemy's will and the effects of the elements on each of the parts. Once that has been analyzed and fully understood, the final step becomes an evaluation of the elements of power on each of the enemy parts. When all of this analysis is complete, only then should the planners proceed forward with the development of courses of action.

U.S. intervention history demonstrates that this process has not been used or performed well. Consequently, the ability to achieve the desired objectives, especially in interventions such as Korea, and Vietnam were not met. Those interventions demonstrate the absolute necessity of improving analysis of the enemy entity and developing better strategy based upon that analysis.

Along with definitions for the enemy and will, a suggested means for performing the proper analysis has been provided within this paper. But the suggested means is not the only means--the idea is to stimulate dialogue to find other ways of improving that process.

At the same time a word of caution goes out to the prospective future planner or strategist who reads this paper. In this age of reduction and doing more with less, we must make every effort to design intervention strategy that is as smart and miserly as possible. This means making the absolute most out of every tool, means, resource, military service, and elements of national power available to achieve the accomplishment of the national goals and interests. There is no room for parochialism or short-cut process planning in intervention strategy. Do not ignore the most important step of strategic planning to save time, or provide simplicity, or one of the dozen other reasons planners fail to perform this step completely...know the enemy, completely, to the point of knowing the will of all the parts of the enemy. By knowing the will and the situation, only then can the planner develop the correct strategy to ensure lasting effects.⁷¹

ENDNOTES

1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, edited by James Clavell, (New York, Delacarte Press, 1983) p. 5.
2. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1976) p. 75.
3. J.F.C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War, US Army Command and General Staff College Reprint, originally--(London, Hutchinson & Co., 1925) p. 334.
4. Haywood S. Hansell Jr., The Air Plan the Defeated Hitler, (Atlanta, GA., Higgins-McArthur/Longino and Porter, 1972) p. 4.
5. see Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, (New York, Currency Doubleday, 1990) p. 14.

6. For more information of the plan used in World War II, see Hansell, chapter IV, pp. 61-99.

For a copy of the plan presented to the Joints Chiefs of Staff by General Ira Eaker see Barry D Watts, The Foundations of U.S. Air Doctrine, (Maxwell AFB, AL, AU Press, 1984) pp. 133-150.

7. Daniel P. Bolger, Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990's, (Novata, CA, Presidio Press) pp. 380, 381.
8. Dennis M. Drew, and Donald M. Snow, The Eagle's Talons, (Maxwell AFB, AL, AU Press, 1988) p. 6.
9. E.C. McKenzie, 14,000 Quips and Quotes for Writers and Speakers, (New York, Wings Books, 1980) p. 541.
10. Ralph Peters, "The Culture of Future Conflict," Parameters, (Winter, 1995-96) p. 23.
11. Richard N. Haass, Intervention, (Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment, 1994) p. 20.
12. For a discussion on the wisdom of maintaining a standing military, see papers 24-27 by Hamilton in The Federalist Papers, by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, (New York, Bantom Books, classic edition pub in 1982) pp. 116-133.
13. Clausewitz, p. 75.
14. Fuller, p. 334.
15. From The American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1982) p. 453.

16. Department of the Army, Field Manual 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, draft ed., (Washington, 15 July 1995) p.1-109.
17. Ralph Peters, "After the Revolution," Parameters, (Summer 1995) pp. 8, 9, 12.
18. John A. Warden III, "The Enemy as a System," Airpower Journal, (Spring 1995) pp 43, 44.
19. Ibid.
20. Clausewitz, p. 79.
21. The trinity is referred to and described on page 89 in the first paragraph of section 28 of Clausewitz. The next paragraph provides a link for empirical understanding, but does not change the trinity.
22. Sun Tzu, p. 1.
23. Warden, p. 47.
24. Ibid, p. 46.
25. Ibid., p. 45.
26. Ibid., p. 49.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 45.
30. Ibid.
31. John A Warden III, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," in Richard H. Schultz Jr. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. editors, The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, (Maxwell AFB, AL, AU Press, July 1992) p. 65. (identified henceforth as "Warden 21st Century")
32. Ibid.
33. Figure 3 appears in Warden, as well as in John A. Warden III, "Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century," in Karl P. Magyar editor, Challenge and Response: Anticipating US

Military Security Concerns, (Maxwell AFB, AL, AU Press, 1994) p. 315. (identified henceforth as Warden Theory)

34. Warden pp. 54, 55.

35. Warden, 21st Century, p. 61.

36. Warden, p. 43.

37. Ibid., p. 42.

38. James M. Dubik, "Sacred Cows Make Good Shoes: Changing the Way We Think About Military Force Structure," Armed Forces Journal, (Jan 1997) p. 45.

39. American Heritage Dictionary, p. 1382.

40. Sun Tzu, p. 2.

41. Ibid., p. 8.

42. Fuller, p. 96.

43. Ibid., p. 55.

44. Ibid., pp. 114-143.

45. Clausewitz, pp. 184, 185.

46. John Spanier, Games Nations Play, 8th Edition, (Washington DC, CQ Press, 1993) p. 177.

47. Fuller, pp. 97, 98.

48. Ibid., p. 115.

49. From Peter Paret, "Clausewitz," in Peter Paret edited, Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1986) p. 201.

50. Ibid.

51. Clausewitz, p. 69.

52. Ibid., p. 89.

53. This is also discussed in Paret, p. 201.

54. Paret, p. 200.
55. Clausewitz, p. 86.
56. Ibid., p. 76.
57. Ibid., p. 78.
58. Ibid., p. 79.
59. Ibid.
60. Paret, p. 201.
61. Paret, p. 869.
62. The indirect approach was the basis of war-fighting theory proposed by B.H. Liddell-Hart and J.F.C Fuller. For further study see Liddell-Hart's book *Strategy*, based upon the successful strategy of Grant and Sherman in the American Civil War.
63. Michael Howard, "Strategy and Policy in Twentieth-Century Warfare," in Harry R. Borowski, The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History 1959-1987, (Washington DC, Office of Air Force History, 1988) p. 352.
64. Everest E. Riccioni, "Strategic Bombing: Always a Myth," Proceedings, (November 1986) p. 51.
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67. Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower, (New York, The Free Press, 1989) p. 2.
68. Ibid., p. 210.
69. T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, (Washington DC, Brassey's, 1963) p. 453.
70. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1959) pp. 28, 29.

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